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ABSTRACT
We have studied two person stochastic dierential games with multiple modes.
For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strate-
gies for both players. For the nonzero sum case we have proved the existence
of a Nash equilibrium.
Key Words. Controlled diusions, Markov chains, Markov strategy, Opti-
mal strategy, Isaacs equation, Nash equilibrium.
INTRODUCTION
We study a two-person stochastic dierential game with multiple modes.
The state of the system at time t is given by a pair (X(t); (t)) 2 R
d
S; S =
f1; 2;    ; Ng. The discrete component (t) describes the various modes of
the system. The continuous component X(t) is governed by a \controlled
diusion process" with a drift vector which depends on the discrete compo-
nent (t). Thus X(t) switches from one diusion path to another at random
times as the mode (t) changes. On the other hand, the discrete component
(t) is a \controlled Markov chain" with a transition rate matrix depending
on the continuous component. The evolution of the process (X(t); (t)) is
governed by the following equations
dX(t) = b(X(t); (t); u
1
(t); u
2
(t))dt + (X(t); (t))dW (t);
P ((t+ t) = j j (t) = i; X(s); (s); s  t) = 
ij
(X(t))t+ o(t); i 6= j;
for t  0; X(0) = x 2 R
d
; (0) = i 2 S;where b; ;  are suitable functions;

ij
 0; i 6= j;
N
X
j=1

ij
= 0;
W () is a standard Brownian motion, u
1
() and u
2
() nonanticipative pro-
cesses taking values in prescribed sets U
1
and U
2
, respectively, which are ad-
missible strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively. This kind of dierential
game was rst studied by Basar and Haurie [1] for a piecewise deterministic
case (  0). They have studied feedback Stackelberg and Nash equilibria
for a nonzero-sum game. Here we consider both zero-sum and nonzero-sum
games. In a zero-sum game player 1 is trying to maximize his expected
(discounted) payo
E [
Z
1
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); u
1
(t); u
2
(t))dt]
over his admissible strategies, where  > 0 is the discount factor and r
is the payo function. Player 2 is trying to minimize the same over his
admissible strategies. This kind of game typically occurs in a pursuit-evasion
problem where an interceptor tries to destroy a specic target. Due to quick
maneuvering by the evader and the corresponding response by the interceptor
the trajectories keep switching rapidly and is generally modelled as a hybrid
system (X(t); (t)) described above [12]. Though pursuit-evasion games are
generally treated on a nite horizon, we have studied the innite horizon case
here. The corresponding results for the nite horizon case can be derived
using analogous (almost identical) arguments. For the zero-sum game we
have established existence of randomized optimal strategies for both players.
We have then treated a special case where at each mode only one player
controls the game (think of billiards, for example). For this special case we
have shown the existence of optimal pure strategies. This may have potential
applications in token ring networks [4, p. 253]. In such networks each node
may be treated as a player and at any time the node having the token controls
the game completely. We next consider the nonzero-sum game where each
player is trying to maximize his own payo. For player `; ` = 1; 2; the payo
is
E [
Z
1
0
e
 t
r
`
(X(t); (t); u
1
(t); u
2
(t))dt]:
This kind of game arises in a situation where two economic agents share
the same production system which is subject to random failure [10]. For a
nonzero-sum game we have established the existence of (Nash) equilibrium.
Our results for a nonzero-sum game extends to the several players case. We
have treated two players only for notational simplicity.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the technical details
of the problems. Zero-sum game is treated in Section 3. Section 4 deals with
nonzero-sume case.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Let V
`
= 1; 2 be compact metric spaces and U
`
= P(V
`
) the space of
probability measures on V
`
endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
Let V = V
1
 V
2
and U = U
1
 U
2
. Let S = f1; 2;    ; Ng. Let

b : R
d
 S  V !R
d
;

b(; ; ) = [

b
1
(; ; );    ;

b
d
(; ; )]
0
 : R
d
 S ! R
dd
; (; ) [
ij
(; )]; 1  i; j  d.

ij
: R
d
!R; 1  i; j  N; 
ij
()  0; i 6= j;
P
N
j=1

ij
() = 0.
We make the following assumptions on

b; ; .
(A1) ( i) For each i 2 S;

b(; i; ; ) is bounded, continuous and Lipschitz
in its rst argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
( ii) For each i 2 S; (; i) is bounded and Lipschitz with the least
eigenvalue of 
0
(; i) uniformly bounded away from zero.
(iii) For i; j 2 S; 
ij
() is bounded and Lipschitz continuous.
For x 2 R
d
;  2 S; (u
1
; u
2
) 2 U = U
1
 U
2
, dene
bk
(x; i; u
1
; u
2
) =
Z
V
1
Z
V
2

b
k
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)u
1
(dv
1
)u
2
(dv
2
); k = 1;    ; d
and
b(x; i; u
1
; u
2
) = [b
1
(x; i; u
1
; u
2
);    ; b
d
(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)]
0
:
Let (X(); ()) be an R
d
 S-valued process given by
dX(t) = b(X(t); (t); u(t))dt+ (X(t); (t))dW (t) (2.1a)
P ((t+ t) = j j (t) = i; (s); X(s); s  t) = 
ij
(X(t))t+ 0(t); i 6= j
(2.1b)
X(0) = x 2 R
d
(0) = i 2 S: (2.1c)
Here, W () = [W
1
();    ;W
d
()]
0
is a standard Wiener process, u() = (u
1
(),
u
2
()) where u
`
() is a U
`
-valued nonanticipative process (see [8] for a precise
denition of nonanticipativity). The process u
`
(); ` = 1; 2; as above is called
an admissible strategy for player `. If u
`
() = v
`
(x(); ()) for a measurable
v
`
: R
d
 S ! U
`
, then u
`
() (or by an abuse of notation the map v
`
itself)
is called a Markov strategy for the `th player. A strategy u
`
() is called
pure if u
`
is a Dirac measure, i.e., u
`
() = 
v
`
(), where v
`
() is a V
`
-valued
nonanticipative process. If for each ` = 1; 2; u
`
() is a Markov strategy then
(2.1) admits a unique strong solution which is a strong Feller process [8]. Let
A
`
;M
`
and D
`
denote the sets of arbitrary admissible, Markov and Markov
pure (\deterministic") strategies, respectively, for player `. For p  1 dene
W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S) = ff : R
d
 S ! R : for each i 2 S; f(; i) 2 W
2;p
loc
(R
d
)g:
W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S) is endowed with the product topology of (W
2;p
loc
(R
d
))
N
. Sim-
ilarly, we dene D(R
d
 S);D
0
(R
d
 S), etc. For f 2 W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S) and
v = (v
1
; v
2
) 2 V
1
 V
2
, we write
L
v
1
;v
2
f(x; i) = L
v
1
;v
2
i
f(x; i) +
N
X
j=1

ij
f(x; j) (2.2)
where
L
v
1
;v
2
i
f(x; i) =
d
X
j=1

b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)
@f(x; i)
@x
j
+
1
2
d
X
j;k=1
a
jk
(x; i)
@
2
f(x; i)
@x
j
@x
k
(2.3)
ajk
(x; i) =
d
X
`=1

j`
(x; i) 
k`
(x; i):
For (u
1
; u
2
) 2 U
1
 U
2
we dene
L
u
1
;u
2
f(x; i) =
Z
V
1
Z
V
2
L
v
1
;v
2
f(x; i)u
1
(dv
1
)u
2
(dv
2
): (2.4)
Zero-Sum Game.
Let r : R
d
 S  V
1
 V
2
!R be the payo function. We assume that
(A2) r is a bounded, continuous function, Lipschitz in its rst argument
uniformly with respect to the rest.
When the state of the system is (x; i) 2 R
d
 S and the players 1, 2
choose the actions v
1
2 V
1
; v
2
2 V
2
, respectively, player 1 receives a payo
r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) from player 2. The problem is to nd a strategy for player
1 which will maximize his accumulated income and a strategy for player
2 which will minimize the same quantity. For performance evaluation, we
consider the discounted payo on the innite horizon. Let  > 0 be the
discount factor. Let (u
1
; u
2
) 2 A
1
 A
2
and (X(); ()) the solution of (2.1)
corresponding to this pair of strategies. The -discounted payo to player 1
for the initial condition (x; i) is dened as follows:
R[u
1
; u
2
] (x; i) = E
u
1
;u
2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); u
1
(t); u
2
(t))dt] (2.5)
where
r : R
d
 S  U
1
 U
2
!R
is dened as
r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
) =
Z
V
1
Z
V
2
r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)u
1
(dv
1
)u
2
(dv
2
): (2.6)
A strategy u

1
2 A
1
is said to be (-discounted) optimal for player 1 if for
(x; i) 2 R
d
 S
R[u

1
; ~u
2
](x; i)  inf
u
2
2A
2
sup
u
1
2A
1
R[u
1
; u
2
](x; i) : =

R(x; i) (2.7)
for any ~u
2
2 A
2
. The function

R : R
d
S !R is called upper value function
of the game. Similarly, a strategy u

2
2 A
2
is said to be optimal for player 2
if
R[~u
1
; u

2
](x; i)  sup
u
2
2A
2
inf
u
1
2A
1
R[u
1
; u
2
](x; i) := R(x; i) (2.8)
for any ~u
1
2 A
1
and (x; i) 2 R
d
 S. The function R : R
d
 S ! R is
called the lower value function of the game. If

R  R, then the game is said
to admit a value and the common function is denoted by R and is called
the value function. Clearly the existence of a pair of optimal strategies for
both players ensures that the value function exists but the converse need not
hold. We will establish the existence of a value function and Markov opimal
strategies for both players. Since the addition of a constant to the payo
function does not alter the optimal strategies, we may (and will) assume
that r  0.
NonZero-Sum Game
For each ` = 1; 2; let r
`
: R
d
 S  V
1
 V
2
! R be the payo function
for player `. We assume that
(A3) r
`
is bounded, continuous and Lipschitz in its rst argument uniformly
with respect to the rest.
When the system is in state (x; i) and the action v = (v
1
; v
2
) 2 V
1
 V
2
are
chosen by the players then player `; ` = 1; 2; receives payo r
`
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
). Let
r
`
: R
d
 S  U
1
 U
2
be dened as follows: for (x; i) 2 R
d
 S; (u
1
; u
2
) 2
U
1
 U
2
r
`
(x; i; u
1
; u
2
) =
Z
V
1
Z
V
2
r
`
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)u
1
(dv
1
)u
2
(dv
2
); k = 1; 2: (2.9)
Each player wants to maximize his accumulated income. We again consider
the -discounted payo on the innite horizon. Let (u
1
; u
2
) 2 A
1
 A
2
. Let
(X(); ()) be the solution of (2.1) corresponding to (u
1
(); u
2
()). Then the
(-discounted) payo to player ` for the initial condition (x; i) is dened as
R
`
[u
1
; u
2
](x; i) = E
u
1
;u
2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
e
 t
r
`
(x(t); (t); u
1
(t); u
2
(t))dt]: (2.10)
A pair of strategies (u

1
; u

2
) 2 A
1
 A
2
is said to be a (Nash) equilibrium if
for (x; i) 2 R
d
 S
R1
[u

1
; u

2
](x; i)  R
1
[u
1
; u

2
](x; i) for any u
1
2 A
1
;
and
R
2
[u

1
; u

2
](x; i)  R
2
[u

1
; u
2
](x; i) for any u
2
2 A
2
: (2.11)
We will establish the existence of an equilibrium in Markov strategies. Note
that the two-person nonzero-sum game can be extended to the N -person
game. We are treating only the two-person case for notational simplicity.
We conclude this section by showing that both the players can conne
their attention to only Markov strategies. To this end we introduce the con-
cept of -discounted occupation measures. Let (u
1
(); u
2
()) 2 A
1
 A
2
and
(X(); ()) the corresponding process. The -discounted occupation measure
denoted by [u
1
; u
2
] 2 P(R
d
 S  V
1
 V
2
) is dened implicitly by
N
X
j=1
Z
R
d
V
1
V
2
f(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)[u
1
; u
2
](dx; i; dv
1
; dv
2
)
=  E
u
1
;u
2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
Z
V
1
Z
V
2
e
 t
f(X(t); (t); v
1
; v
2
)u
1
(t)(dv
1
)u
2
(t)(dv
2
)dt]
(2.12)
for f 2 C
b
(R
d
 S  V
1
 V
2
). Indeed, [u
1
; u
2
] will depend on the ini-
tial condtion (x; i), but we have suppressed this dependence for notational
convenience. In terms of [u
1
; u
2
], (2.5) becomes
R[u
1
; u
2
](x; i) = 
 1
N
X
j=1
Z
R
d
V
1
V
2
r(y; j; v
1
; v
2
)[u
1
; u
2
](dy; j; dv
1
; dv
2
)
(2.13)
and (2.10) becomes
R
`
[u
1
; u
2
](x; i) = 
 1
N
X
j=1
Z
R
d
V
1
V
2
r
`
(y; j; v
1
; v
2
)[u
1
; u
2
](dy; j; dv
1
; dv
2
):
(2.14)
Let
[A
1
; A
2
] = f[u
1
; u
2
] j (u
1
; u
2
) 2 A
1
 A
2
g:
[M
1
; A
2
]; [A
1
;M
2
]; [M
1
;M
2
] etc. are dened analogously. We can closely
mimic the proof of [8, Lemma 4.2], to obtain the following result.
Lemma 2.1. For any xed initial condition
[A
1
;M
2
] = [M
1
;M
2
] = [M
1
; A
2
]:
It immediately follows from the above lemma that for the two person
zero-sum game no player can improve his payo by going beyond Markov
strategies. For the nonzero-sum game there is no notion of value of the
game. Dierent pairs of equilibrium strategies may yield varied payos to
the players. However, due to the enormous complexity in implementing a
non-Markov strategy both players look for equilibrium in Markov strategies
only.
ZERO-SUM GAME
In this section we will establish Markov optimal strategies for both play-
ers. To this end we rst study the corresponding Isaacs equation given by
inf
u
2
2U
2
sup
u
1
2U
1
[L
u
1
;u
2
(x; i) + r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)]
= sup
u
1
2U
1
inf
u
2
2U
2
[L
u
1
;u
2
(x; i) + r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)] = (x; i): (3.1)
Note that (3.1) is a quasilinear system of uniformly elliptic equations with
weak coupling in the sense that the coupling occurs only in the zeroth order
term.
Theorem 3.1. Under (A1), (A2) the equation (3.1) has a unique solution
in C
2
(R
d
 S) \ C
b
(R
d
 S).
Proof. Consider rst the system of equations
inf
u
2
2U
2
sup
u
1
2U
2
[L
u
1
;u
2
(x; i) + r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)] = (x; i): (3.2)
For R > 0, let B
R
= fx 2 R
d
: jxj < Rg. Consider the following Dirichlet
problem on B
R
 S
inf
u
2
2U
1
sup
u
1
2U
2
[L
u
1
;u
2
(x; i) + r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)] = (x; i) in B
R
 S (3.3a)
(x; i) j
@B
R
S
= 0: (3.3b)
Under (A1), (A2) the existence of a unique solution 
R
(x; i) of (3.3) in
W
2;p
(B
R
 S); 2  p < 1, is guaranteed by using the arguments in [11,
Thm. 5.1, p. 422]. Thus to each R > 0 there corresponds a solution 
R
of (3.3) belonging to W
2;p
(B
R
 S); 2  p <1. By the Sobolev imbedding
theorem 
R
(x; i) 2 C
1;
(B
R
 S), for 0 <  < 1;  arbitrarily close to 1, and
hence by our assumption on

b; ; r ((A1); (A2)), it is easy to see that
(x; i)  inf
u
2
2U
2
sup
u
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)
@
R
(x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
R
(x; j) + r(x; i; u
1
; u
2
)]
is in C
0;
. By elliptic regularity [9, p. 287] applied to (3.3a) it follows that

R
(x; i) 2 C
2;r
(B
R
 S). Standard arguments involving Ito's formula yield

R
(x; i) =
inf
u
2
2M
2
sup
u
1
2M
1
E
u
1
;u
2
x;i
[
Z

R
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); u
1
(X(t); (t)); u
2
(X(t); (t))dt];
(3.4)
where 
R
is the hitting time of @B
R
of the processX(). Since r  0; 
R
(x; i) 

R(x; i) (the upper value of the game). Clearly 
R
(x; i) is nondecreasing in R.
Let R
0
> R. Then by the interior estimates [11, pp. 398-402] f
R
0
g
R
0
>R
is
bounded in B
R
S uniformly in R
0
and fr
R
0
g
R
0
>R
is bounded inW
1;2
(B
R

S) uniformly in R
0
. By the Sobolev imbedding theorem W
1;2
(B
R
 S) ,!
L
2+
(B
R
 S) for some  > 0. Then by suitably modifying the arguments in
(4.10) in [11, p. 400], we obtain
jj 
R
0
jj W
2;2+
(B
R
S)
 k
R
;
where k
R
is a constant independent of R
0
. (The modication is needed be-
cause of the factor  > 0, but it is routine). Repeating the above procedure
over and over again we conclude that f
R
0
g
R
0
>R
is uniformly bounded in
W
2;p
(B
R
 S) for 2  p < 1. Since W
2;p
(B
R
 S) ,! W
1;p
(B
R
 S)
and the injection is compact, it follows that f
R
0
g
R
0
>R
converges strongly in
W
1;p
(B
R
 S). Thus given any sequence fR
n
g; R
n
! 1 as n ! 1, and
for any xed integer N  2, we can choose a subsequence fR
n
i
g such that
f
R
n
i
g converges strongly in W
1;p
(B
N 1
 S). Using a suitable diagonaliza-
tion, we may assume that f
R
n
i
g converges strongly in W
1;p
(B
N 1
 S) for
each N  2. Let  be a limit point of f
R
n
i
g. It can be shown as in [3, p.
148] (see also [11, p. 420]) that
inf
u
2
2U
2
sup
u
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; k; u
1
; u
2
)
@
R
n
i
(x; k)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

kj

R
n
i
(x; k)
+ r(x; k; u
1
; u
2
)]
n
i
!1
! inf
u
2
2U
2
sup
u
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; k; u
1
; u
2
)
@ (x; k)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

kj
(x)
+ r(x; k; u
1
; u
2
)]
strongly in L
p
(B
N 1
 S). Therefore  2 W
1;p
loc
(R
d
 S) and it satises
(3.2) in D
0
(R
d
 S); i :e: in the sense of distributions. By elliptic regularity
 2 W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S). Then by the Sobolev imbedding theorem and elliptic
regularity  2 C
2;
(R
d
 S); 0 <  < 1;  arbitrarily close to 1. Using (A1),
(A2), and Fan's minimax theorem [6] it follows that  satises (3.1). Clearly
 2 C
b
(R
d
 S). Let v

1
() 2 M
1
and v

2
() 2 M
2
be the outer maximizing
and outer minimizing selectors respectively in (3.1). The existence of such
selectors is guaranteed by a standard measurable selection theorem [2]. Then
routine arguments involving Ito's formula yield
 (x; i) = E
v

1
;v

2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); v

1
(X(t)(t)); v

2
(X(t); (t)))dt]
= inf
v
2
2M
1
sup
v
1
2M
1
E
v
1
;v
2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); v
1
(X(t)(t)); v
2
(X(t); (t)))dt]
= sup
v
1
2M
2
inf
v
2
2M
2
E
v
1
;v
2
x;i
[
Z
1
0
e
 t
r(X(t); (t); v
1
(X(t)(t)); v
2
(X(t); (t)))dt]:
Thus  (x; i) = V (x; i) =

V (x; i) = V (x; i), the value of the game. To prove
uniqueness let V
0
(x; i) be another solution of (3.1) in C
2
(R
d
S)\C
b
(R
d
S).
Let k be a common bound on j V (; ) j and j V
0
(; ) j. Then it can be shown
that (see [5, pp. 69-70])
j V (x; i)  V
0
(x; i) j  2e
 t
k:
Letting t!1, we have V  V
0
.
Theorem 3.2. Assume the conditions (A1), (A2). Let v

1
2 M
1
be such
that
inf
v
2
2U
2
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v

1
(x; i); v
2
)
@V (x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)V (x; j)+ r(x; i; v

1
(x; i); v
2
)]
= sup
v
1
2U
1
inf
v
2
2U
2
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)
@V (x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)V (x; j) + r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)]
(3.5)
for each i and a:e:x. Then v

1
is optimal for player 1.
Similarly, let v

2
2M
2
be such that
sup
v
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v

2
(x; i))
@V (x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)V (x; i) + r(x; i; v
1
; v

2
(x; i)]
= inf
v
2
2U
2
sup
v
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)
@V (x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)V (x; j) + r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
)]
(3.6)
for each i and a:e:x. Then v

2
is optimal for player 2.
Proof. We prove this claim for the rst player. The corresponding claim for
the second player follows similarly. Let v

1
2M
1
satisfy (3.5). The existence
of such v

1
follows from a standard measurable selection theorem [2, Lemma
1]. Pick any v
2
2 M
2
. Let (X(); ()) be the process governed by (v

1
; v
2
)
with X(0) = x; (0) = i. Then using the same arguments as in the proof of
the previous theorem, we can show that
V (x; i)  R[v

1
; v
2
](x; i):
Hence v

1
is optimal for player 1.
We now consider a special case where in each discrete state i 2 S, one
player controls the game exclusively. In other words, we assume the following
(A4) Let S
1
= fi
1
;    ; i
m
g  S; S
2
= fj
1
;    ; j
n
g  S be such that
S
1
\ S
2
=  and S
1
[ S
2
= S. Further assume that

b(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) =

b
1
(x; i; v
1
)
r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) = r
1
(x; i; v
2
)
for i 2 S
1
,

b
1
: R
d
 S
1
 V
1
!R
r
1
: R
d
 S
1
 V
2
!R
satisfying the same conditions as

b and r
1
. Also for any i 2 S
2

b(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) =

b
2
(x; i; v
2
)
r(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) = r
2
(x; i; v
2
)
satisfying the same conditions as

b and r (cf , (A1), (A2)).
Theorem 3.3. Under (A1), (A4), each player has Markov optimal pure
strategies.
Proof. Let i
m
2 S
1
. Then under (A4) we have
V (x; i
m
) = sup
u
1
2U
1
[
P
d
k=1
R
V
1

b
1k
(x; i
m
; v
1
)u
1
(dv
1
)
@V (x;i
m
)
@x
k
+
N
X
j=1

i
m
j(x)V (x; j) +
Z
V
1
r(x; i
m
; v
1
)u
1
(dv
1
)]: (3.7)
For each (x; i
m
) the supremum in the above will be attained at an ex-
treme point of U
1
= P(V
1
). Thus to each (x; i
m
) 2 R
d
 S
1
there exists
a v

1
(x; i
m
) 2 V
1
such that the supremum in (3.7) is obtained at 
v

1
(x;i
m
)
. The
map (x; i
m
) ! v

1
(x; i
m
) may be assumed to be measurable in view of the
measurable selection theorem in [2]. Thus the strategy v

1
2 D
1
is optimal
for player 1. The claim for the second players follows similarly.
NONZERO-SUM GAME
We make the following assumption
(A5)

b and r
k
; k = 1; 2; are of the form

b(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) =

b
1
(x; i; v
1
) +

b
2
(x; i; v
2
)
r
k
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
) = r
1k
(x; i; v
1
) + r
2k
(x; i; v
2
); k = 1; 2;
where

b
`
: R
d
 S  V
`
! R
d
; r
`k
: R
d
 S  V
`
! R, satisfy the same
assumptions as

b; r .
Let (v
1
; v
2
) 2 M
1
M
2
. By Lemma 2.1, for any (x; i) 2 R
d
 S
sup
u
1
2A
1
R
1
[u
1
; v
2
](x; i) = sup
u
1
2M
1
R
1
[u
1
; v
2
](x; i)
sup
u
2
2A
2
R
2
[v
1
; u
2
](x; i) = sup
u
2
2M
2
R
2
[v
1
; u
2
](x; i):
In view of the results in [8] the above suprema on the right hand side can be
replaced by maxima. Thus, there exist v

1
2M
1
; v

2
2M
2
such that
sup
u
1
2A
1
R
1
[u
1
; v
2
](x; i) = max
u
1
2A
1
R
2
[u
1
; v
2
](x; i)
= R
1
[v

1
; v
2
](x; i) :=
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; i) (4.1)
sup
u
2
2A
2
R
2
[v
1
; u
2
](x; i) = max
u
2
2A
2
R
2
[v
1
; u
2
](x; i)
= R
2
[v
1
; v

2
](x; i) :=
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; i): (4.2)
Indeed, v

1
will depend on v
2
and v

2
will depend on v
1
. v

1
(resp. v

2
) is called
the optimal response of player 1 (resp. player 2) given player 2 (resp. player
1) is employing v
2
(resp. v
1
). From [8] the following result follows.
Lemma 4.1. Fix (v
1
; v
2
) 2M
1
M
2
. Then
~
R
1
[v
2
] is the unique solution in
W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S) \ C
b
(R
d
 S); 2  p <1, of
sup
u
1
2U
1
[L
u
1
;v
2
(x; i) + r(x; i; u
1
; v
2
(x; i)] = (x; i) (4.3)
in R
d
 S. A strategy v

1
2 M
1
is an optimal response for player 1, given
player 2 is employing v
2
, if and only if
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v

1
(x; i); v
2
(x; i))
@
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; j)
+ r
1
(x; v

1
(x; i); v
2
(x; i)]
= sup
v
1
2U
1
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
(x; i))
@
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; j)
+r
1
(x; v
1
; v
2
(x; i)]: (4.4)
Similarly,
~
R
2
[v
1
] is the unique solution in W
2;p
loc
(R
d
 S) \ C
b
(R
d
 S); 2 
p <1, of
sup
u
2
2U
2
[L
v
1
;u
2
 (x; i) + r
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); u
2
)] =  (x; i) (4.5)
in R
d
 S. A strategy v

2
2 M
2
is an optimal response for player 2, given
player 1 is employing v
1
, if and only if
[
d
X
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v

2
(x; i))
@
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; j)
+r
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v

2
(x; i)]
= sup
v
2
2U
2
[
d
X
j=1
b(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
)
@
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1
(x)
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; j)
+r
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
)]: (4.6)
Theorem 4.1. Under (A1), (A3), (A5) there exists an equilibrium (v

1
; v

2
) 2
M
1
M
2
.
Proof. Let M
1
and M
2
be endowed with the metric topology described
in [8]. (See Lemma 3.2 in [8] for the convergence criterion describing the
topology of M
1
;M
2
). Then M
1
and M
2
are compact, metric spaces. Let
M
1
M
2
be endowed with the product topology. Let (v
1
; v
2
) 2 M
1
M
2
.
Let (v
1
; v
2
) 2 U
1
 U
2
. Set
F
1
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
(x; i)) =
P
d
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
(x; i))
@
~
R
1
[v
2
](x;i)
@x
j
+
N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
~
R
1
[v
2
](x; i)
@x
j
+ r
1
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
(x; i))
F
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
) =
P
d
j=1
b
j
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
)
@
~
R
2
[v
1
](x;i)
@x
j
+N
X
j=1

ij
(x)
~
R
2
[v
1
](x; i) + r
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
):
Let
G
1
[v
2
] = fv

1
2M
1
j F
1
(x; i; v

1
(x; i); v
2
(x; i)) = sup
v
1
2U
1
F
1
(x; i; v
1
; v
2
(x; i))
a.e.x, for each i g
G
2
[v
1
] = fv

2
j F
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v

2
(x; i)) = sup
v
2
2U
2
F
2
(x; i; v
1
(x; i); v
2
) a:e:x;
for each ig.
Then G
1
[v
2
] and G
2
[v
1
] are nonempty, convex, compact subsets of M
1
and
M
2
, respectively. Let G[v
1
; v
2
] = G
1
[v
2
]G
2
[v
1
]. Then G[v
1
; v
2
] is a noempty,
convex and compact subset of M
1
M
2
. Thus (v
1
; v
2
) ! G[v
1
; v
2
] denes
a point-to-set map from M
1
 M
2
to 2
M
1
M
2
. Mimicking the arguments
in [5, Thm. 5.1] this map is seen to be upper semicontinuous under the
assumption (A1), (A2) and (A5). By Fan's xed point theorem [7], there
exists (v

1
; v

2
) 2 M
1
M
2
such that (v

1
; v

2
) 2 G
2
[v

1
; v

2
]. The pair (v

1
; v

2
) is
clearly an equilibrium.
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